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Abstract  
 
This article evaluates the structural changes that have taken place in the Norwegian 
bus industry after competitive tendering was introduced in 1994 in order to show that 
this procurement mechanism implies more than just efficiency gains. In a long-term 
view the many takeovers and increasing ownership links among the transport 
companies may weaken the competitive element of tendering and lead to an 
unwanted market situation with only a limited number of suppliers. To maintain 
market competition, the transport authorities should differentiate their procurement 
strategy and use competitive tendering together with other public procurement 
approaches. 
 
  
 
21. Introduction
In Norway, as in most other European countries, transport companies operating 
scheduled services on road, sea and rail receive substantial subsidies from the 
state. During the last two decades, governments worldwide have introduced
competitive market mechanisms in their public transport systems. Even though there 
is variation between countries, the general outcome of competition in the transport 
industry is cost savings (Cox and Duthion, 2001). The transport industry in 
Scandinavia has also been increasingly exposed to competition, but public 
authorities still exercise strong control over the quality and quantity of the services 
offered compared to the situation in countries which have more extensive 
deregulation, such as the UK.
The importance of subsidy allocation policies have been discussed in some studies 
of bus industry efficiency (e.g. Dalen and Gomez-Lobo, 2003; Jørgensen et al., 
1997). Also studies considering competitive tendering have mainly focused on the 
short-term efficiency gains. The general effect of competitive tendering on cost 
reduction is proven in empirical studies of the Norwegian bus industry (Bekken et 
al., 2006; Carlquist and Johansen, 1999) and in several other developed countries 
(Hensher and Wallis, 2005; Preston, 2005; Transportrådet, 1998). According to 
Preston (2005), tendering typically gives around 20 percent reduced unit costs
compared to a situation of an unchallenged public monopoly operation. These 
expected efficiency gains have been the most important motivation for the 
introduction of competitive tendering in the Norwegian bus industry (Ministry of 
Transport and Communication, 1990).
However, this procurement regime also brings with it consequences with respect to 
market structure which have been much less debated. Nash (2005) addresses such 
3consequences when describing the extensive consolidation of companies and the 
dominance of the industry by three large groups when the UK bus services were 
exposed to competition. Also in Sweden the reform in the late 1980’s allowing the
use of competitive tendering is suggested to have initiated major changes in the 
market structure (Alexandersson et al., 1998). These structural changes are similar 
to those experienced in the Norwegian bus industry after competitive tendering was 
introduced. 
The aim of the article is to evaluate the structural changes that have taken place in 
the Norwegian bus industry after the introduction of competitive tendering in 1994 in 
order to show that this procurement mechanism could imply more than just 
efficiency gains. Furthermore, we suggest implications of the structural changes for 
the local transport authorities’ long-term procurement policies. The Norwegian case 
is interesting in this context because the transport industry still has a considerably
lower share of tendered contracts than such industries in neighbouring countries
(e.g. Sweden and Denmark). Now that competitive procurement mechanisms are 
gradually being introduced in Norway, we can study the implementation of
competitive tendering as it takes place with basis in knowledge from similar 
processes in other countries.
The article is organised as follows: First, section 2 presents tendering in the 
Norwegian bus industry. Section 3 gives a general discussion of the relationship 
between increased competition and structural change. Section 4 analyses the 
structural changes that have taken place in the Norwegian bus industry. Finally, the 
concluding remarks in section 5 highlight important policy implications of the 
structural changes among the bus operators.
42. Tendering in the Norwegian bus industry
Historically, Norwegian public bus transport services have been subject to 
substantial public regulation. Until 1991, the county councils in Norway used either 
direct negotiations, standardised cost norms or a combination of the two to 
determine the size of the subsidy allocated to a bus operator. Transport legislation 
was changed in 1991 allowing county councils to use competitive tendering as an 
alternative to negotiations and cost norms from 1 April 1994. Today, the county 
councils in Norway may combine or choose between direct negotiations, cost norms 
and tendering when distributing subsidies among bus operators. 
Despite having the opportunity to use tendering, it has only been initiated on a 
limited part of the Norwegian bus services up to now. Many county councils are still 
unsure whether they should introduce tendering because they see many practical 
problems such as lack of competition, weak incentives for investment in short-term
contracts and specification problems in contracts (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). An 
alternative way to achieve cost reduction is to employ long-term performance-based 
contracts in which the counties commit themselves not to use tendering during the 
contract period if the operators manage to reduce production costs. It is argued that, 
given the total amount of subsidy support available, such contracts are more 
attractive than competitive tendering in terms of securing maximum social welfare 
for the community (Hensher and Stanley, 2003). In Norway, the first county to 
implement such incentives in performance-based contracts was Hordaland
(Carlquist, 2001). 
Bekken et al. (2006), presenting simple cost trends for the subsidised passenger 
transport in the Norwegian bus industry, shows that the average total cost per 
vehicle-kilometre had a decreasing trend during the early 1990s, but has lately 
5flattened out, and in some counties has even risen. The cost reductions related to 
the exposure to competition can be explained both by the actual use of tendering, 
and also by the authorities’ ability and threat to put bus services out to tender
(Carlquist and Johansen, 1999). Comparing the variation in tendering practices
between counties, Bekken et al. (2006) suggests that the decrease in average total 
costs per vehicle-km has been most prominent where the majority of contracts are 
tendered. The most competitive counties are characterised by having the highest
average population, total costs and subsidies. 
The development of total average unit costs can be explained by factors with 
contradictory effects. While exposure to competition, technological progress and 
improvements in the road network reduces the average costs, increased traffic 
congestion in the cities pull in the other direction. Prices on important cost 
generating inputs for the transport industry has generally increased more than the 
consumer price index (CPI) and indicates increased real prices for transport 
services between 1991 and 20042. Only the purchasing prices of new vehicles have 
increased less than the CPI. Hence, the observed reduction in average costs per 
vehicle-km must be caused by something else than reduced input prices and the 
most important factor is the introduction of competitive tendering. 
The use of competitive tendering in bus operations in Norway is increasing, but it
varies considerably between the 19 counties. The overview in Figure 1 shows that 
tendering is most frequently used in the more densely populated southern regions of 
Norway. After a slow introduction, the use of competitive tendering has increased 
substantially since 1999. The share of vehicle-kms put out to tender was 2 percent 
in 1999, 7 percent in 2001, 16 percent in 2003 and 26 percent in the summer of 
2005. A study of the 70 contracts put out to tender from 1995 to 2006 shows that 
6both the average duration of the contracts and number of vehicle-kms has increased 
and that the number of bidders generally has been around 3-5 (Bekken et al., 2006).
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
The main reason for the rapid growth in tendered contracts after 2001 is the clause
from 1994 that gave the bus companies the opportunity to cease their operations 
and demand public redemption of operating equipment and fixed assets related to 
production if more than 20 percent of the companies’ bus production was offered for 
tender during the following eight years. Sweden had a similar clause (e.g. Jansson 
and Wallin, 1991), but the transitional period was shorter than in Norway. The
introduction of tendering was met by strong opposition from the bus industry and the
long duration of the transitional period was a result of severe pressure from the bus 
industry towards the authorities. Now that this clause is history, future 
implementation of tendered contracts is mostly depending on changes in the local 
political regime. The political debate after 1994 regarding transport policy has shown 
that the conservative parties believe more strongly in tendering than the socialist 
parties. Based on statements from the counties in 2006 the share of tendered 
contracts is expected to grow to approximately 30 percent by 2009. Still, this is 
modest compared to the neighbouring Nordic countries. After a progressive 
implementation during the 1990s, today almost all public bus services in the other 
Nordic countries are subject to competitive tendering (Alexandersson et al., 1998; 
Hensher and Wallis, 2005). 
However, the introduction of tendering in the Norwegian bus industry in 1994 has 
changed not only the efficiency in bus operations. This ‘new’ procurement regime 
has also changed both the number of bus companies and the ownership structure in 
the bus industry. Among other things we have witnessed many takeovers and an
7increased frequency of ownership links between companies. Moreover, large 
holding companies from countries outside Norway, e.g. Connex (France), have 
begun to acquire shares in Norwegian transport companies. This indicates a
determined positioning by the companies in response to an expected increase in the
use of competitive tendering in the Norwegian bus industry.
3. Theoretical framework
In the strongly regulated Norwegian bus industry it is reasonable that changes in the 
regulatory regime lead to structural changes. Figure 2 illustrates a probable
relationship between changes in the regulatory regime and structural changes in the 
bus industry. The short-term effect of introducing competition is (i) increased cost 
efficiency and reduced subsidy requirements in the industry. A neglected long-term 
effect of such change in the regulatory regime is (ii) structural change in the industry 
that eventually could reduce competition and weaken the efficiency focus and thus 
partly invalidate the intended efficiency gains.
(Insert Figure 2 about here.)
3.1 Improved infrastructure and economies of scale
In order to emphasise the importance of the regulatory change in the context of the 
Norwegian bus industry it is necessary to discuss other factors that could influence 
market structure. Hence, two important factors will be addressed, 1) improvements 
in infrastructure and 2) economies of scale.  
The Norwegian bus industry has benefited from an improvement of the road
infrastructure that has in turn improved the working conditions for the transport 
8companies. Due to the rough terrain of fjords and mountains, road construction in 
Norway is difficult and expensive. Some municipalities have partly been isolated
because of poor connections to the national road network. For that reason several 
areas were previously served by only one company. During the 1980s and 1990s
the isolation of several geographical areas was lessened due to the construction of 
several bridges and underwater tunnels (Ryntveit and Lian, 1993). The road 
infrastructure improvement has opened new transport markets for large scale 
operations and indirectly paved the way for mergers and takeovers. However, these 
potential structural changes would probably not have happened so rapidly if there 
were no threat of competition.
A major motive for acquiring a rival in a takeover is the prospect of reducing the 
average unit cost by utilizing economies of scale. Transport companies located on 
the decreasing side of the unit cost curve will reduce average costs and increase 
profitability if they manage to merge and thereby increase efficiency. However, 
studies assessing economies of scale in the Norwegian bus industry show a slightly
U-formed cost curve, indicating that companies above a relatively low minimum size
of 500 000 vehicle-kilometres achieve little or even nothing by further growth
(Jørgensen et al., 1995; Jørgensen et al., 1997). Bekken et al. (2006) found, using a 
simple linear cost function on a more recent data set, that economies of scale are 
generally lacking in the Norwegian bus industry. Studying productivity, Cowie & 
Asenova (1999) found evidence of a minimum efficiency scale followed by constant 
returns to scale in the British bus industry. Odeck & Alkadi (2004), using Norwegian 
data from 1994, conclude that there is a U-formed relationship between size and 
efficiency. Based on the findings of these studies it seems that there are no 
considerable scale effects when a company exceeds a certain minimum size.
(Insert Table 1 about here.)
9Table 1 shows the mean- and median size of the Norwegian bus companies 
receiving subsidies from the local transport authorities in 1991 and 2004. The mean 
value has increased relatively more than the median value because a few 
companies have grown very large. Most importantly, using the definition of small 
companies from Jørgensen et al. (1995), the table shows that the share of 
companies with less than 500 000 vehicle-kilometres has only been reduced by 5 
percentage points from 1991 to 2004. Hence, consolidation takes place also in 
larger companies where scale effects are less prominent. Therefore, and with 
support from the data set, it is likely that other factors than economies of scale must 
be present to explain the substantial structural changes which have taken place in 
the Norwegian bus industry.
Despite constant returns to scale, it would be desirable for a company to grow in 
order to handle the comprehensive tendered contracts. In Norway the number of 
vehicle-kms included in the contracts put out to tender has increased over the years 
and effectively excluded the smaller companies from competition both financially 
and with respect to transport capacity. Additionally, larger companies have more 
resources to build and keep the administrative competence specialised to compete 
for tendered contracts. 
3.2 Competitive tendering as an auction
As described in section 2, the Norwegian public bus transport procurement policy 
has moved from giving the exclusive rights to the local company towards 
competitive tendering presenting the companies for the uncertainty whether they get 
the contract or not. It can be argued that this change towards a regulatory regime 
with competition will alter the behaviour of the companies. Earlier, under strict 
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regulation the companies had to negotiate with the transport authorities to increase 
profit. However, when competitive tendering is used, a profit increasing strategy for 
a company is to reduce the number of actual competitors (e.g. by cross-ownership 
or mergers) in order to exercise market power so that bids can be raised and 
producer surplus increased. Such exercise of market power is discussed in the 
competition policy literature and generally considered to hurt both consumers and 
society at large (e.g. Motta, 2004).
In Norway, tendering using gross cost contracts is most commonly used (Bekken et 
al., 2006). That is, the company with the lowest subsidy requirement wins and 
receives the exclusive right to operate the specified transport network for a 
predefined number of years. As discussed in Preston (2005) the bidding strategies 
in gross cost contracts, also called the Scandinavian model, can be explained by 
auction theory. Gross cost contracts have the characteristics of a game similar to 
first price auctions in which costs are private information. In auction models, 
structural changes can be discussed by implementing ownership links. Theoretical 
studies of auctions conclude that ownership links between two bidders damage both 
seller and society (Chillemi, 2005). Even where relatively small ownership links are 
involved, they encourages collaborative agreements that weaken the potential 
efficiency gains from competition (Reynolds and Snapp, 1986).
A company acquiring ownership shares in a competitor gains access to and 
influence over corporate strategies, and thus both increases its profit and reduces 
competition. The profit sharing implies that a company keeps more of the 
competitors profit when the ownership share increases and gives less aggressive 
competition because the loss of losing the auction is reduced as cross-ownership 
increases. This is demonstrated by Greenlee & Waehrer (2004) in a game with profit 
sharing using symmetric ownership-shares in first-price auctions. In Mathisen 
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(2007), this game is adapted to tendering auctions in passenger transport using 
costs as private information. The conclusion is that the subsidy requirement 
(equilibrium bid) is slightly lower than the expected bid of the next best competitor
and increasing with cross-ownership. Consequently, the introduction of auctions 
tend to give companies a profit incentive for increasing cross-ownership to reduce 
the downside of losing the auction and thus handle the uncertainty related to 
competitive tendering. This gives a higher winning subsidy bid and thus partially 
invalidates the transport authorities intended cost reductions of competitive 
tendering. Hence, strategic actions such as takeovers and increased cross-
ownership are the expected consequences of exposure to competition and could 
have contributed to the substantial concentration of ownership and market power in 
the Norwegian bus industry.
4. Structural changes in the Norwegian bus industry
When describing the structural changes in the Norwegian bus industry we will 
address four dimensions: 1) number and size of companies, 2) ownership structure
in terms of private or public and foreign or non-foreign, 3) market concentration and 
4) ownership links. When addressing these four dimensions we find first, that the 
number of companies is reduced and average size increased. Second, foreign firms 
have entered the market and state owned firms have acquired both private and 
municipality owned companies. Third, the market concentration both with respect to 
individual companies and groups of companies has increased substantially. Finally, 
increasing ownership links makes disturbingly close relationships between the 
bidders within a county.
All bus companies are obliged to report accounting information to the national 
authorities and production information to the local transport authorities and this 
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information is accessible through national data bases. Further information used in 
the analysis (shareholders and extensiveness of cross-ownership) was obtained 
directly from the bus companies and the transport authorities in Norway’s 19 
counties. Our data set consists of information from bus companies in Norway in 
1991 and 2004; i.e. the first observations represent the situation 3 years before the 
introduction of tendering and the last observations represent the situation about ten 
years afterwards. The observations from these two years are considered 
comparable because bus services are, despite some technological advances in the 
industry, virtually the same today as they were a decade ago. All bus companies
providing local bus services subsidised by the transport authorities, except school 
transport, will be analysed. Bus companies operating only tour coaches and other 
purely commercial operations are not included in this analysis. In the cases where 
bus companies operate more than subsidised passenger transport services, specific 
information regarding the subsidised activities is available because the counties
require separate production and accounting data from the companies to fulfil the 
subsidy contracts. 
4.1 Number and size of companies
Table 2 shows the number of bus companies in Norway in 1991 and 2004 
distributed according to the different counties. It should be noted that, due to 
ownership links, the actual number of independent companies is lower than 
exhibited in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2 about here.)
As shown in Table 2 the total number of bus companies in Norway has been 
reduced from 173 in 1991 to 95 in 2004, a 45 percent reduction. Because the yearly 
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subsidised bus production has been relatively stable3, takeovers have increased the 
average company size. Measuring average company size by vehicle-kms, the 
growth has been 65 percent, from 1.7 million vehicle-kms in 1991 (Solvoll et al., 
1994) to 2.8 million vehicle-kms in 2004. Even though Norway has 19 counties, the 
bus services in the Norwegian capital, Oslo, and the adjacent county, Akershus, is 
so closely connected that the two counties have been merged in the table. 
From the left, Table 2 shows the distribution of bus companies according to the 
postal address of their central office. In 1991 practically every company operated 
only within its ‘home’ county due to historical exclusive rights to specific concession 
areas while 10 of the 95 companies operated in two or more counties in 2004.
Hence, the column to the right giving the actual number of companies operating bus 
services in the county in 2004 exceeds the total number of companies. Competitive 
tendering has made it possible for companies to operate outside their ‘home’ county 
and has lead to a higher geographical scattering of the bus companies’ production. 
Hence, in 2004 the actual number of companies operating in each county differs 
from the postal-address distribution of the companies. For example, two companies 
provided bus services in Vestfold in 2004, but neither of them had their central office 
in the county.
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the reduction in the number of bus companies 
varies substantially between counties. Our data indicate that counties with modest 
use of competitive tendering have less reduction in the number of companies. This 
is probably a consequence of the fact that counties interested in stable long-term 
negotiated contracts are not giving the companies incentives to engage cross-
ownership and mergers. Indeed, the data shows that all counties with a less than 50 
percent reduction in the number of companies have either not implemented or have 
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only partially implemented competitive tendering. Also note that the only county 
without local bus companies (Vestfold) has put all its production out to tender.
This tendency for the reduction of bus companies to be less in counties without 
tendering can be illustrated by a bivariate linear OLS regression4. Let the dependent 
variable, Y, be the percentage reduction in the number of bus companies in the 
county from 1991 to 2004 and the independent variable, X, be the percentage share
of vehicle-kms offered for tendering in the county in 2004. The estimation results are 
presented in equation (1) (t-values in brackets). 
(1) 
(2.7)    (4.2)       
)18,312.0(R     477.0278.0 2  NXY
Equation (1) shows that the percentage share of vehicle-kms offered for tendering in 
a county, X, has a significant positive impact on the reduction in the number of 
companies, Y. A straightforward interpretation is that a 1 percentage point increase
in the use of competitive tendering has reduced the number of companies by about 
0.477 percentage points. The R2 indicates that about 31 percent of the variance in 
the percentage reduction in the number of companies from 1991 to 2004 is 
explained by this model. The assumption of constant variance is confirmed as the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test5 did not reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity.
4.2 Ownership structure
Theoretically, the incentive of profit should make private companies more efficient 
than public firms and thus better suited for competitive markets than public 
companies (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). However, the empirical literature is 
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ambiguous regarding the relationship between efficiency and ownership. In a review 
article De Borger et al. (2002) conclude that ownership is one of several factors 
directly affecting efficiency. Cowie & Asenova (1999) refer to North American 
studies which have found that higher costs are present in publicly owned 
companies. Filippini & Prioni (2003) could, in a study of the bus industry in 
Switzerland, only partly confirm that private companies operated more efficiently 
than public ones. Analysis of the Norwegian bus industry finds, on the contrary, no 
evidence that privately owned companies are more efficient than public ones
(Holvad et al., 2004; Jørgensen et al., 1995; Odeck and Alkadi, 2004). The general 
conclusion from the empirical studies seems to be that the presence of competition
in the subsidy allocation policy increases efficiency, while the type of ownership has 
less of an impact on efficiency. 
Table 3 categorizes the bus companies in Norway in 1991 and 2004 with respect to 
ownership structure. A company is defined as privately owned if the majority (more 
than 50 percent) of its shares is controlled by individuals or private companies. 
Otherwise the company is defined as publicly owned. These two categories are 
further divided into two subcategories, resulting in four categories of majority 
ownership. The privately owned companies are divided, according to the nationality 
of the ownership, into non-foreign- and foreign-owned companies. Next, publicly 
owned companies are divided according to the owning public entity into non-locally
owned (the State/central government) and locally owned (municipalities and 
counties) companies.
It is somewhat surprising that public companies have increased their market share 
as competition has increased due to competitive tendering. In addition to profit, 
public companies are assumed to have maximization of social surplus as a goal in 
their utility function. This should presumably make public companies less focused on 
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profit and efficiency than profit-maximizing private companies. However, in the 
Norwegian bus industry the largest group of companies, Nettbuss AS, is fully state
owned but operates with few or no local attachments and appears as a private 
company that maximises its profit. Hence, we find it reasonable to divide the public 
companies in the Norwegian bus industry into two categories: state-owned (by the 
national central government) companies and companies owned by local authorities 
like municipalities and counties. Table 3 shows that the share of companies with
local public ownership clearly has decreased while the share of companies with non-
local public ownership has increased as competition has increased. Also in earlier 
studies has it been indicated that it is reasonable to divide between different types of 
public ownership (e.g. Bhattacharyya et al., 1995). 
(Insert Table 3 about here.) 
Table 3 shows that the number of non-foreign-owned private companies and locally
owned public companies has been reduced while the number of foreign-owned
private companies and non-locally-owned public companies has increased. The 
development is similar when focusing on the share of total vehicle-kms for each 
category instead of the number of companies. In total, even though the takeovers 
between 1991 and 2004 have caused a much (almost 15 times) greater reduction in
privately owned companies than publicly owned companies, the privately owned 
companies still constitute a majority of bus operators in Norway. The relative share 
of publicly owned companies has increased from 24 percent in 1991 to 38 percent in 
2004. State-owned companies have taken over several companies and have 
increased substantially from 5 percent of all companies in 1991 to 18 percent in 
2004. The share of publicly owned companies has grown mainly because of one 
group of companies, Nettbuss AS, which is fully owned by The Norwegian State 
Railways (NSB). Nettbuss AS has acquired both local public companies and private 
17
companies and its subsidiaries are in 2004 present in 15 of the 19 counties. This 
group of companies was in 2004 responsible for about one third of the total 
subsidised bus services in Norway and was the third largest bus company within the 
Nordic countries.
In the period 1991–2004, no new Norwegian-owned bus company has entered the 
market; however, several foreign-owned bus companies have. Furthermore, the 
existing Norwegian companies have only consolidated or changed owners during 
that time. To our knowledge, there were no Norwegian bus companies with a 
majority of foreign owners in 1991. Data shows that mainly American, British, 
French and Swedish shareholders have been involved in the Norwegian bus 
industry since competitive tendering was introduced in 1994. At the end of 2004 
there were two groups with majority foreign ownership—Connex (France) which had
both acquired Norwegian bus companies and founded new companies and 
Schøyens Bilcentraler which is 51 percent owned by the American group Goldman 
Sachs. Foreign controlled companies operate in 8 of the 19 counties, including both 
rural and urban areas. Even though only 5 out of 95 companies (5.2 percent) in our 
data set are classified as foreign-owned, i.e. more than 50 percent foreign 
ownership, they are responsible for over 31 million vehicle-kms or about 10 percent 
of the traffic volume. A recent example of a foreign takeover is Connex’s acquisition
in 2003 of Finnmark’s only transport company which had, since it was founded in 
1916, been fully owned by the county of Finnmark.
Because counties and municipalities have reduced their direct ownership interests in 
transport companies, they control less of the production in 2004 than they did in 
1991. Therefore, local transport authorities are in a weaker position to directly 
influence the companies’ strategies, especially with respect to the quality of 
transport services. However, this weakness can to some degree be compensated 
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for by the local authorities’ paying careful attention to service quality issues in their 
contracts with the transport companies. 
4.3. Market concentration
The Norwegian bus industry was in 1999 dominated by alliances of independent 
companies (Carlquist and Johansen, 1999). From 1999 to 2004, increasing 
ownership links between companies gave a few large groups market dominance. 
Thus, the market concentration in Norway has gone through two stages; the first 
stage involved the formation of strategic alliances by independent companies and 
the second involved the quite rapid growth of large groups of companies with strong 
ownership links. 
Measures of market concentration is widely discussed in the Industrial Organization 
literature (e.g. Lipczynski et al., 2005). Using vehicle-kilometres we will apply three
well-known market concentration measures: 1) the Lorenz curve/Gini coefficient 
which is a relative measure, 2) the n-firm concentration ratio which is an absolute 
measure and 3) the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) assessing the sum of 
squared market shares. The level of analysis is the individual companies for the 
Lorenz curve and the groups of companies for the HHI, while the concentration ratio 
is given for both levels. 
As originally conceived, the Lorenz curve/Gini coefficient is a measure of income 
inequality and is applied in transport, e.g. by Fridstrøm et al. (2000), to analyse the 
distribution effects of various transport policies. When adapted to measure market 
concentration, the Lorenz diagram in Figure 3 shows the cumulative size of the 
companies on the vertical axis which are ranked from largest to smallest on the 
horizontal axis. The 45 line indicates the situation where all firms are of equal size. 
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Studying individual companies, the curves indicate that the market concentration
both in 1991 and 2004 were higher than a situation with equally sized companies. 
The inequality in the company size distribution illustrated by the Lorenz curve can be
more precisely defined by the Gini coefficient. G = 0 corresponds to the case of n 
equal-sized companies while G = 1 corresponds to the case of one dominant 
company and n – 1 small and negligible companies. Calculations on the subsidised 
part of the Norwegian bus industry result in Gini coefficients of 0.57 in 1991 and 
0.61 in 2004. This confirms the tendency of increasing market concentration. 
(Insert Figure 3 about here.)
The concentration ratio, 


n
i
i
V
v
Cn
1
, gives the total market share of the industry’s n 
largest companies measured in share of vehicle-kms. Company i’s market share is 
defined as the number of vehicle-kms, vi, divided by the total number of vehicle-kms 
operated in the market, V. Table 4 shows the concentration ratio on the national 
basis for different levels of n for individual companies and groups respectively. This 
measure shows more clearly than the Lorenz curve that the market concentration 
has increased substantially from 1991 to 2004. For example, when studying groups 
of companies the C3 has increased from 0.13 in 1991 to 0.48 in 2004. As expected,
when the number of companies decreases and the total number of vehicle-kms 
remains approximately at the same level, the market concentration increases. 
(Insert Table 4 about here.) 
The HHI for groups of companies has increased substantially from a very low level 
around 200 in 1991 to 1250 in 2004. According to US Merger Guidelines (Motta, 
2004) there is reason to pay closer attention if the post-merger HHI is higher than
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1000 and the increase in HHI caused by the merger exceeds 100 points. Hence, the 
Norwegian transport authorities should be aware of potential market concentration 
problems for future mergers in the industry. However, only a few companies operate
nationwide and the HHI values are substantially higher on the county level where 
the actual competition takes place. The HHI varies considerably between counties 
and ranges from 1300 to 10 000 (one company) with a mean of 4480.  
4.4. Ownership links 
Increased market concentration has also resulted in increased ownership links, 
implying that most bus companies in Norway are related to one or more of the larger
ownership groups. Since ownership links were almost nonexistent in 1991, the 
following discussion will only present measurements for 2004. 
The six largest groups control about 35 percent of the companies and account for 
about 65 percent of the traffic volume. On the national basis 57 percent of the 
transport companies have owners that, either directly or indirectly, have shares in 
other bus companies. Within an average county, 46 percent of the companies 
‘compete’ with companies with which they have ownership links. Ownership links 
can be expressed by calculating the average share, AS, of a company that is owned 
by other bus companies as expressed in equation (2).
(2) 


n
i
isn
AS
1
1
The share of company i owned by other bus companies, si, is summarized for all 
companies and divided by the total number of companies, n. The value of AS is 0.48
and indicate that, on average, 48 percent of the shares in the Norwegian bus 
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companies are owned by other bus companies. Considering that the high number of 
small family-owned companies and sole-proprietorships lowers the average, this 
means that most of the large bus companies in Norway are related through 
ownership links of varying degrees. A better illustration of the actual market 
concentration can be expressed by equation (3) where each observation has been 
given weight according to size.
(3)
V
v
s
n
AWS i
n
i
i


1
1
The average weighted share, AWS, is calculated by giving the share of company i 
that is owned by other bus companies, si, a weight according to share of production 
measured in vehicle-kms. The share of production is derived by dividing company i’s 
produced vehicle-kms, vi, by the total number of vehicle-kms operated in the market, 
V. The value for AWS is 0.78 meaning that, on average, 78 percent of the bus 
services are produced by companies having ownership links. Since AWS > AS, 
large companies have a higher level of ownership links than the small ones. 
Both AS and AWS show that there is a high level of ownership links in the 
Norwegian bus industry. Consequently, when a local network of routes is put out for
competitive tendering it is likely that some of the bidders will have quite strong 
ownership links with other bidders. The fact that the average number of bidders is 3-
5 companies suggests a lack of real competition for some of the tendered contracts. 
5. Conclusions and implications
The use of competitive tendering in bus operations is still substantially lower in 
Norway than in the other Nordic countries and the UK. This is due to a later 
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introduction of competitive tendering and a transitional period, where the counties 
had restricted incentives for implementing tendered contracts, which was long 
compared to Norway’s neighbouring countries. The clause during the transitional 
period lasted for eight years and gave the bus companies the right to cease 
operation and demand redemption of assets if the counties put a high share of the 
production out to tender. Ten years after its introduction in 1994, competitive 
tendering accounted for only 20 percent of bus production in 2004; this share is
expected to increase to 30 percent by 2009. The uncertainty related to competitive 
tendering is likely to have increased cross-ownership and reduced the number of 
bus companies. A review of the structural changes that have taken place in the 
Norwegian bus industry between 1991, 3 years before tendering was introduced, 
and 2004 shows that:
 There has been a 45 percent decrease in the number of bus companies,
from 173 in 1991 to 95 in 2004. This has led to a 65 percent increase in the
average company size from 1.7 million vehicle-kms to 2.8 million vehicle-kms 
per year. 
 The reduction in the number of bus companies has been greatest in the 
counties with the most extensive use of competitive tendering. The 
relationship between the use of tendering and the reduction in the number of 
companies is demonstrated by statistically significant coefficients in a linear 
OLS regression analysis. 
 The number of private companies and local public companies has decreased
while the number of foreign private companies and non-local public 
companies has increased. This indicates that companies with local 
attachment are being ousted by foreign and state companies as competition 
increases.
 The developments in ownership structure show an increasingly complex and 
interwoven set of ownership links. While the Norwegian bus industry in 1991
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consisted of independent companies, it was by 2004 dominated by a few 
large groups with strong ownership links. 
As discussed in section 3, increased cross-ownership in the Norwegian bus industry 
can be viewed as strategic positioning on the part of the companies due to the threat 
and/or implementation of competitive tendering. Indeed, the introduction of tendering 
has increased competition in the Norwegian bus industry which has in turn caused
structural changes towards larger companies and increased market concentration. 
These structural changes have been given little attention by the transport 
authorities. Even though the Norwegian Competition Authority has expressed its 
concern for the competitive effect of the Norwegian State Railways (NSB) owning
the dominant bus company under the current competitive regime, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication do not act on the recommendations (Norwegian 
Competition Authority, 2004). The reduced number of companies could be 
problematic because effective competition requires several independent 
participants. However, these structural changes could be regarded as desirable for 
the transport authorities and the public if the resulting larger companies were to 
operate more cost efficiently than smaller ones, but, unfortunately, earlier studies 
indicate only limited economies of scale.
Transport authorities should be aware of these structural changes when considering 
how to best continue the implementation of competitive tendering. In a long-term 
view these changes might lead to undesirable local monopolies which can weaken 
the competitive element of tendering and thus reduce both quality and cost 
efficiency. Based on the experiences in countries that have implemented tendering 
at a larger scale than Norway and the development we have seen in the Norwegian 
ferry and road construction industry, it is most likely that we will have only a few 
large independent bus companies left in Norway in the future.
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It is important that the local transport authorities bear in mind that competitive 
tendering is only a means of achieving efficiency rather than a goal in itself. To avoid 
that regulators are becoming dependent on monopoly operators because of the 
extensive use of competitive tendering, we now see a growing interest in the use of 
performance- and output-based contracting as an alternative to competitive 
tendering. By combining different forms of procurement strategies, local authorities 
can maintain both the basis for competition and the overall long-term objective of 
maximizing the social surplus of public transport services. 
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for the comments from Finn Jørgensen, Torben Holvad and Derek 
Clark on earlier versions of this paper. We would also like to thank the anonymous 
referees of this journal for valuable comments.
25
References 
Alexandersson, G., Hulten, S. and Folster, S. (1998) 'The effects of competition in 
Swedish local bus services', Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
32(2), pp. 203–219.
Baum, C. F. (2006) An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. Stata 
Press, College Station, Texas.
Bekken, J.-T., Longva, F., Fearnley, N., Frøysadal, E. and Osland, O. (2006) 
Procurement and contracts for local bus services. Report no. 819, Institute of 
Transport Economics, Oslo, Norway.
Bhattacharyya, A., Kumbhakar, S. C. and Bhattacharyya, A. (1995) 'Ownership 
structure and cost efficiency - A study of publicly owned passenger-bus 
transportation companies in India', Journal of Productivity Analysis, 6(1), pp. 
47–61.
Carlquist, E. (2001) 'Incentive contracts in Norwegian local public transport: the 
Hordaland model'. Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on 
Competition and Ownership of Land Passenger Transport, Molde, Norway.
Carlquist, E. and Johansen, K. W. (1999) Local public transport systems: financial 
and organisational frameworks in Norway and abroad. Report no. 451, 
Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo, Norway.
Chillemi, O. (2005) 'Cross-owned firms competing in auctions', Games and 
Economic Behavior, 51(1), pp. 1–19.
Cowie, J. and Asenova, D. (1999) 'Organisation form, scale effects and efficiency in 
the British bus industry', Transportation, 26(3), pp. 231–248.
Cox, W. and Duthion, B. (2001, June) 'Competition in urban public transport - A 
world view'. Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on 
Competition and Ownership in Land Transport, Molde, Norway.
26
Dalen, D. M. and Gomez-Lobo, A. (2003) 'Yardsticks on the road: Regulatory 
contracts and cost efficiency in the Norwegian bus industry', Transportation, 
30(4), pp. 371–386.
De Borger, B., Kerstens, K. and Costa, Á. (2002) 'Public transit performance: what 
does one learn from frontier studies?' Transport Reviews, 22(1), pp. 1–38.
Filippini, M. and Prioni, P. (2003) 'The influence of ownership on the cost of bus 
service provision in Switzerland - an empirical illustration', Applied Economics, 
35(6), pp. 683–690.
Fridstrøm, L., Minken, H., Moilanen, P., Shepherd, S. and Vold, A. (2000) Economic 
and equity effects of marginal cost pricing in transport. Case studies from 
three European cities. Report no. 71, VATT, Government Institution for 
Economic Research Helsinki, Finland.
Greenlee, P. and Waehrer, K. (2004) The effect of profit sharing on auction markets 
Workingpaper, U.S. Department of Justice.
Hensher, D. A. and Stanley, J. (2003) 'Performance-based quality contracts in bus 
service provision', Transportation Research Part A - Policy and Practice, 37(6), 
pp. 519–538.
Hensher, D. A. and Wallis, I. P. (2005) 'Competitive tendering as a contracting 
mechanism for subsidising transport', Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, 39, pp. 295–321.
Holvad, T., Hougaard, J. L., Kronborg, D. and Kvist, H. K. (2004) 'Measuring 
inefficiency in the Norwegian bus industry using multi-directional efficiency 
analysis', Transportation, 31(3), pp. 349–369.
Jansson, K. and Wallin, B. (1991) 'Deregulation of Public Transport in Sweden', 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 25(1), pp. 97-107.
Jørgensen, F., Pedersen, P. A. and Solvoll, G. (1995) 'The costs of bus operations 
in Norway', Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 29(3), pp. 253–262.
27
Jørgensen, F., Pedersen, P. A. and Volden, R. (1997) 'Estimating the inefficiency in 
the Norwegian bus industry from stochastic cost frontier models', 
Transportation, 24(4), pp. 421–433.
Lipczynski, J., Wilson, J. and Goddard, J. (2005) Industrial organization : 
competition, strategy, policy, (2nd ed.). Prentice Hall/Financial Times, Harlow.
Mathisen, T. A. (2007) 'Increasing cross-ownership to meet the uncertainty of 
competitive tendering'. Paper presented at the 29th National Norwegian 
Research Conference for Economists, Tromsø, Norway.
Ministry of Transport and Communication (1990) Ot.prp. nr. 64 - Om lov om 
endringar i lov 4. juni 1976 nr. 63 om samferdsel, (Changes in the transport 
law dated 4th of June 1976 no. 63). In Norwegian.
Motta, M. (2004) Competition policy : theory and practice. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
Nash, C. A. (2005) 'Privatization in transport', in K. Button and D. A. Hensher (eds.), 
Handbook of transport strategy, policy and institutions (Vol. 6, pp. 97-113). 
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Norwegian Competition Authority (2004) Annual report 2003 
Odeck, J. and Alkadi, A. (2004) 'The performance of subsidized urban and rural 
public bus operators: Empirical evidence from Norway', Annals of Regional 
Science, 38(3), pp. 413–431.
Preston, J. (2005) 'Tendering of services', in K. Button and D. A. Hensher (eds.), 
Handbook of transport strategy, policy and institutions, (Vol. 6, pp. 65-81.). 
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Reynolds, R. J. and Snapp, B. R. (1986) 'The competitive effects of partial equity 
interests and joint ventures', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
4(2), pp. 141–153.
28
Ryntveit, G. O. and Lian, J. I. (1993) Ringvirkninger av endret vegtilgjengelighet.
(Extended effects of changes in road accessibility). In Norwegian. Report no. 
168, Norwegian Institute of Transport Research, Oslo, Norway.
Solvoll, G., Pedersen, P. A. and Jørgensen, F. (1994) Trafikkselskapsstruktur og 
effektivitet: en analyse av bussdriften i Norge. (Transport company structure 
and efficiency: an analysis of the Norwegian bus industry). In Norwegian. 
Report no. 4, Nordland Research Institute, Bodø, Norway.
Transportrådet (1998) Bustrafik i 7 Europæiske Lande - Oversigt over organisering. 
(Bus transport in 7 different European countries - a review). In Danish. 
Workingpaper 1/1998, Transportrådet, Denmark.
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1988) Privatization: an economic analysis. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2006) Introductory econometrics: a modern approach, (3rd ed.). 
Thomson South-Western, Mason, Ohio.
29
Notes  
1. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the European 
Transport Conference in Strasbourg, October 2005.
2. The Norwegian consumer price index presented by Statistics Norway 
(www.ssb.no) has increased by 31 % from 1991 to 2004. During the same 
time-period, the cost indexes for operation and maintenance, fuel and vehicle 
purchase have increased by 58 %, 144 % and 22 %, respectively. The index 
for wages in the transport industry is available from 1998 and increased by 
34 % to 2004. During the same time-period the consumer price index 
increased by 13 %. 
3. The public procurement of bus services was about 270 million vehicle-
kilometres in 1991 and about 261 million vehicle-kilometres in 2004. 
4. Estimations using a quadratic function gave higher R2 but reduced model-
and variable significance compared to the linear model. 
5. For details about homoskedasticity see e.g. Wooldridge (2006) and for 
practical application of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test in Stata see 
e.g. Baum (2006).  
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Table Captions
Table 1 Size distribution (vehicle-kms) of the bus companies receiving public subsidies in 
1991 and 2004.
Table 2 Number of bus companies in different counties in Norway in 1991 and 2004.
Table 3 The distribution of companies in the Norwegian bus industry in 1991 and 2004 with 
respect to ownership.
Table 4 Concentration ratio (Cn) for the n largest companies in the Norwegian bus industry 
in 1991 and 2004.
Figure Captions
Figure 1 Share of the Norwegian subsidised bus services for tendered contracts in 2004.
Figure 2 Relationship between regulatory changes and structural changes in the Norwegian 
bus industry.
Figure 3 Lorenz diagram for the Norwegian bus industry in 1991 and 2004.
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Figure 3
 1991 2004 
Mean  1 563 000 2 752 000
Median 920 000 1 200 000
Share of small companiesa)  40 % (69) 36 % (34)
a Companies with a yearly production of less than 500 000 vehicle-kms is defined as small. 
 
Table 1
 
Companies with  
central office in the county 
  Change County 
1991 2004 Number Percent 
Bus operators 
within the  
county in 2004 
Østfold 11 5 -6 -55 % 6 
Akershus/Oslo 11 5 -6 -55 % 6 
Hedmark 8 2 -6 -75 % 5 
Oppland 13 7 -6 -46 % 11 
Buskerud 11 7 -4 -36 % 6 
Vestfold 11 0 -11 -100 % 2 
Telemark 12 8 -4 -33 % 9 
Aust-Agder 6 6 0 0 % 7 
Vest-Agder 4 3 -1 -25 % 4 
Rogaland 15 12 -3 -20 % 11 
Hordaland 13 6 -7 -54 % 5 
Sogn og Fjordane 6 4 -2 -33 % 4 
Møre og Romsdal 17 9 -8 -47 % 10 
Sør-Trøndelag 6 5 -1 -17 % 6 
Nord- Trøndelag 13 4 -9 -69 % 5 
Nordland 11 8 -3 -27 % 7 
Troms 4 3 -1 -25 % 4 
Finnmark 1 1 0 0 % 1 
Total 173 95 78 -45 %  
 
Table 2
 1991 2004 Change 
Type of ownership  Number Share Number Share Number Percent 
Non-foreign 132 76 % 54 57 % -78 -59 %Private 
Foreign  0 0 % 5 5 % 5 NA 
Total private companies 132 76 % 59 62 % -73 -55 %
State 9 5 % 17 18 % 8 89 %Public 
Local public 32 19 % 19 20 % -13 -41 %
Total public companies 41 24 % 36 38 % -5 -12 %
Bus industry as a whole 173 100 % 95 100 % -78 -45 %
 
Table 3
  Cn 1991 Cn 2004 
n Companies Groups Companies Groups 
3 0,09 0,13 0,18 0,48 
5 0,14 0,18 0,26 0,60 
8 0,20 0,25 0,35 0,75 
 
Table 4
